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1980 S C M R 959

 

Present: Dorab Patel and Nasim Hasan Shah, JJ

 

AHMAD DIN‑Petitioner

 

Versus

 

Mst. SYRAN BI ETC.‑Respondents

 

Civil Petition. Or Special Leave to Appeal No. 65 of 1975, decided on 25th March, 1980.

 

(On appeal from the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court dated 11‑11‑1974 in Review Petition 28/C of 1974)

 

 

Bashir Zafar, Advocate and M. A. Qadri, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.

 

Nemo for Respondents

 

Date of hearing: 19th March, 1980.

 

ORDER

 

DORAB PATEL, J‑In 1970, the petitioner filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Jhelum, against the respondents for a declaration that he .was entitled to a 3/4th share in the estate of one Noor Muhammad, deceased, but by his judgment dated 11‑10‑1971 the learned Civil Judge decreed the petitioner’s suit for a 1/4th share in the estate of Noor Muhammad, deceased. Therefore, he challenged this judgment in an appeal in the District Court, Jhelum, but as the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal, he intended first to challenge the judgment of the learned District Judge in a second appeal in the Lahore High Court. However, on account of the promulgation of the Law Reforms Ordinance and on the assumption that the value and subject matter of the suit under appeal was less `than Rs. 2,000 he filed a revision in the High Court against the judgment of the District Judge. This revision was dismissed in limine by a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court on 29‑3‑1974 on the ground that no case had been made out for a revision. Then nearly three months later, the petitioner sought a review of this order of 29‑3‑1974 on the ground that as the value of the subject matter of the property in the case was much more than Rs. 2,000 “the revision petition was not competent, therefore, regular second appeal as originally filed by the petitioner is still pending undisposed of.

 

It is not surprising that this extraordinary application was dismissed on 11‑11‑1974 on the short ground that no case whosoever had been made out for interference under Order XLVII of the Civil Procedure Code. Hence this petition for leave.

 

We have examined the revision application filed by the petitioner, which is at page 17 of the Paper Book. It is described as “Civil Revision No. 54 of 1974” and there is nothing whatever in the three paragraphs of the revision which are described as grounds of appeal to lead to the view that the subject matter of the property in dispute exceeded Rs. 2,000 in value. In these circumstances, as the petitioner’s Advocate had pressed the case only as a revision, we agreed with the view of the learned Judge that the dismissal of the revision in limine did not amount to an error, much less an error apparent on the record within the meaning of Order XLVII, rule 1 of the, Civil Procedure Code.

 

Additionally, there is another difficulty in the way of the petitioner on which we have not received assistance on the footing that the petitioner’s revision was maintainable it had to be filed under Article 162 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act within twenty days from the dismissal in limine of the petitioner’s revision application. Instead it was filed nearly three months later without any application for condoning the delay in filing the review application. However, in his application for condoning delay in this Court the petitioner has stated that his petition for leave is in time if time is reckoned from the date of the delivery of the impugned orders to him. And, his further contention is that he had applied for a certified copy of the High Court’s order dismissing his revision on the very day on which the revision was dismissed and that this copy had been delivered to him on 27‑111974, therefore, his petition for leave was in time as it was filed on 7‑12‑1974. The question, however, is whether the petitioner’s review application was within time in the High Court and on the plain language of Article 162 it was grossly time‑barred. Now, as far as we can see, it is in order to overcome this difficulty that the petitioner has pleaded that the time for obtaining the certified copy of the High Court’s order of 29‑3‑1974 should be excluded. But, this certified copy was obtained on 27‑11‑1974. whilst the review application was filed on 24‑6‑1974. This means that the review application was filed without supplying the Court a certified copy of the order, which was sought to be reviewed and on examining the High Court’s record that appears to be the position. Therefore, as the petitioner did not file a certified copy of the High Court’s order of 29‑3‑1974 in support of his review application, it is clear that the time taken by him in obtaining this certified copy was not time which was required within the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation Act for filing a time‑barred review application e in the High Court. Therefore, the review application merited dismissal of the further ground that it was grossly time‑barred and as it was time‑bane the question of granting leave does not arise.

 

The petition is without merit and is dismissed.

 

Petition dismissed.

 

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