2004 P L C (C.S.) 443
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]
Present: Javed Iqbal and Karamat Nazir Bhandari, JJ
ABDUL REHMAN
versus
THE FORCE COMMANDER AIRPORT SECUIRTY FORCE, KARACHI and 3 others
Civil Petition No. 1006‑L of 2001, decided on 3rd June, 2003.
(On appeal from the judgment dated 9‑2‑2001 of the Federal Service Tribunal passed in Appeal No.34(L) of 1999).
Gul Muhammad v. The Force Commander 1999 SCMR 2935; Wali Ahmed Khan v. Karachi Development Authority 2000 PLC (C.S.) 806 and Force Commander, A.S.F. v. Muhammad Rashid 1996 SCMR 1614 fol.
Mian Mahmood Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court and Faiz‑ur Rehman, Advocate‑on‑Record (absent) for petitioner.
Nemo for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 3rd June, 2003.
ORDER
JAVED IQBAL, J‑‑‑This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment dated 9‑2‑2001 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal whereby the order dated 31‑8‑1998 retiring the petitioner from service has been kept intact.
2. Precisely stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner while performing as Inspector at the Airport Security Force, Multan, was compulsory retired from service on 31‑8‑1998 without observing the formalities as envisaged under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. Being aggrieved a departmental appeal was preferred on 2‑9‑1998 which could not be decided within the statutory period of 90 days the petitioner approached learned Service Tribunal by means of appeal dated 9‑1‑1999 which was dismissed due to want of jurisdiction vide judgment impugned.
3. Mian Mahmood Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court appeared on behalf of petitioner and urged strenuously that the Service Tribunal has failed to decide the question of jurisdiction in accordance with law and ignored the petitioner’s status of civil servant which was not disputed and accordingly the question regarding dismissal from service was within the exclusive jurisdictional domain of the learned Service Tribunal constituted under Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and no sub‑severance legislation could have curtailed its jurisdiction which aspect of the matter has been ignored without any rhyme and reason resulting in serious miscarriage of justice.
4. We have carefully examined the contentions as agitated on behalf of the petitioner and have gone through the judgment impugned carefully. The pivotal question which needs determination would be as to whether learned Service Tribunal had the jurisdiction to dilate upon and decide the appeal preferred on behalf of petitioner in view of the provisions as contemplated in section 7‑A (4) of the Airport Security Force Act, 1975. The Tribunal while discussing the question of its jurisdiction has concluded as follows:‑‑
“After plain reading of the above reproduction of the amendments, one can easily conclude that every officer and member of the Force (ASF) shall be subject to the Pak Army Act, 1952, and that after insertion of new subsection(4) in section 7‑A, the Service Tribunal has ceased to have jurisdiction in matters of discipline in case of the employees of ASF meaning thereby, no appeal will be entertainable before this Tribunal in respect of orders like challenged in the instant appeals passed by any officer of the said Force, authorized under Army Act, 1952. It is not disputed that the appellants being ex‑employees of the ASF, have agitated the impugned orders passed by the Authorities under Pak Army Act, 1952 read with ASF Act, 1975.”
5. The conclusion as arrived at by the learned Service Tribunal is strictly in accordance with law. In fact there could be no other interpretation except as has been made by the learned Service Tribunal which also finds support from the case‑law as enunciated i in Gul Muhammad v. The Force Commander (1999 SCMR 2935), Wali Ahmed Khan v. Karachi Development Authority (2000 PLC (CS) 806), Force Commander, A.S.F. v. Muhammad Rashid (1996 SCMR 1614).
6. In sequel to .the above mentioned discussion the appeal has rightly been dismissed by the learned Service Tribunal due to want of jurisdiction. Besides that no question of law of public importance is involved in the matter on the basis whereof leave could be granted. The petition being devoid of merit is dismissed.
S.A.K./A‑435/SC Petition dismissed.
