Limitation Act 1908 (PREAMBLE) 2014 MLD 1135 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT


2014 M L D 1135




Before Shah Jehan Khan Akhundzada, J






ALLIED BANK LTD. and another—Respondents


R.F.A. No. 22-P of 2013, decided on 30th April, 2013.


Jan Muhammad Khan for Appellant.




SHAH JEHAN KHAN AKHUNDZADA, J.—Khan Shahzada appellant/plaintiff brought a suit against respondents/defendants for the recovery of Rs.50,00,000 (Rupees Fifty lac) for damages, on account of mental torture, defamation of the personal and family reputation and for the compensation to him for keeping him behind the bars for a period of more than one year due to malicious prosecution and false charge against him levelled by respondent/defendant No. 1.


3. The suit was contested by the respondents/defendants by filing written statement. After framing issues, the case was fixed for recording evidence of the appellant/plaintiff but despite several opportunities he failed to produce the same and ultimately the learned trial Judge vide his judgment and decree dated 28-5-2012 dismissed his suit under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. Feeling aggrieved from the above judgment and decree of the learned trial court, the appellant/plaintiff preferred an appeal bearing No.61/13 of 2012 before the learned Addl. District Judge-VI, Peshawar which was dismissed by him for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction vide his judgment and decree dated 28-11-2012. Hence, the appellant/plaintiff has filed the instant Regular First Appeal for setting aside the orders of both the courts below.


4. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and have also perused the material available on the file.


5. A perusal of the material placed on file would show that the appellant/plaintiff had instituted a suit against the respondents/defendants for the recovery of Rs.50-lacs in the trial court which was dismissed under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. against which he has preferred appeal before the learned Addl. District Judge-VI Peshawar despite the fact that the pecuniary jurisdictional value being Rs.50-lacs the appellate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because the lower appellate court has got the pecuniary jurisdiction for hearing the appeals against the judgments and decrees of the lower courts in cases in which the subject matter is not more than Rs.10-Lacs. Thus, it was incumbent upon the appellant/plaintiff to prefer the appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 28-5-2012 before the High Court but he himself is guilty for preferring appeal before the court of Addl. District Judge when the value of the suit for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction was (Rs.50-lacs) mentioned by him in the plaint and was also evident from decree sheet which could not have escaped his attention. Since the suit of the appellant/plaintiff was dismissed by the trial court under Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. vide judgment and decree dated 28-5-2012 and he preferred the instant Regular First Appeal before this Court on 18-12-2012 after dismissal/return of his appeal on account of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction, therefore, the instant regular first appeal is hopelessly barred by time. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff could not give any reasonable and plausible justification, as to why the appellant/plaintiff has preferred appeal before the learned Addl.District Judge-VI, knowing the fact that he has got no jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal on account of having no pecuniary jurisdiction exceeding Rs.10-lcas thus, the learned Addl.District Judge has rightly dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The law of limitation cannot be considered merely a formality but the same is required to be observed and taken into consideration being mandatory in nature. The purpose of law of limitation is to help the vigilant and not the indolent. A helping hand may not be extended to a litigant having gone into deep slumber, on having become forgetful of the his rights. Concerned person has, however, to be made aware of the invasion of his interests, and awareness has to be ascertained as a matter of fact. Thus, in view of the above discussion, this Regular First Appeal being hopelessly time barred is liable to be dismissed in limine.


6. Consequently, the instant appeal is dismissed in limine.


AG/296/P Appeal dismissed.

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